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MOHAMED ELEWA BADAR & POLONA FLORIJANČIČ 
THE COGNITIVE AND LINGUISTIC IMPLICATIONS OF ISIS PROPAGANDA: 
PROVING THE CRIME OF DIRECT AND PUBLIC INCITEMENT TO GENOCIDE  
 
INTRODUCTION  
The self-declared Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL/IS/Da’esh) spread their propaganda far and wide 
through radio stations, television, social media, online forums, physical distribution of 
writings etc.1 When assessing whether this propaganda constitutes the international crime 
of direct and public incitement to commit genocide, one must consider utterances which 
directly fulfil the necessary actus reus and mens rea of said crime, as well as the propaganda 
techniques used in the surrounding narrative which prepares the audience to become 
susceptible to carrying out such calls.  
 
Dealing with the crime of incitement to genocide itself is unique in the sense that it requires 
the expertise of linguistics in order to determine the meaning of the words uttered in their 
geographical, cultural or religious contexts. For example, in determining whether incitement 
to genocide took place, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), was faced 
with the challenging task of understanding the Kinyarwanda language.2  None of the judges 
and very few lawyers in the prosecution and defense teams spoke the language.3 Alexander 
Zahar argues that the Tribunal was thinking in English semantics rather than Kinyarwanda 
semantics.4 Essentially, thinking in different semantics and through the prism of a different 
culture or tradition can result in a failure to accurately determine the intent of the speaker 
as well as how the targeted audience perceived a certain discourse, both essential elements 




This chapter will thus analyze key concepts and labels employed by ISIS by placing them 
in their linguistic, historical, religious and ideological contexts. By doing so it will convey 
the intended implications of the discourse on the part of the speaker as well as its likely 
perception on the part of the audience. It is important to note that in order to appeal to their 
audiences, ISIS rely heavily on culturally and religiously well-established Islamic concepts 
thus even when writing or speaking in other languages, they refer to such concepts in their 
original Arabic form. A clear understanding of the meanings behind the words uttered is 
further essential for a finding of the requisite mens rea in lieu of excessive reliance on a 
causal link with subsequent crimes committed for this purpose.6  
 
This chapter will further analyze the cognitive implications of ISIS propaganda by looking 
at how they employ various media, imagery, music and sound effects in order to make their 
polarizing messaging more effective. In ISIS Al Hayāt Media Centre’s7 own words, their 
aim is to ‘convey the message of the Islamic state in different languages with the goal of 
unifying the Muslims under one flag.’8 While essentially the same themes run through their 
various media, each one serves to achieve a different psychological effect on the audience 
with the main aim of creating a black and white picture of the world. The audience is 
presented with a choice of being either with the ISIS and following their strict interpretations 
of Islam, including the necessity of killing and terrorizing everyone who remains outside 
the group, or are themselves branded unbelievers and therefore a lawful target for killing. 
The demarcation between the in-group and out-group is thus constructed entirely on a very 
specifically defined religious belief and practices with absolutely no room for leniency or 
compromise with regards to variations in said belief or approach to the ‘other’. ISIS tap into 
mainstream Muslim expectations and beliefs, sentiments and grievances, to structure a 
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convincing narrative of hatred and the denial of any dignity of the out-group.  
 
Building a case against ISIS and putting together evidences proving incitement to genocide 
is very timely particularly in light of the adoption of the United Nations Security Council 
Res. 2379 (2017) which established an investigative team to Promote Accountability for 
Da’esh/ISIL Crimes (UNITAD) and to ensure that perpetrators of those heinous crimes be 
brought to justice.9 Since Iraq has ratified the Genocide Convention on January 20, 1959,10 
individuals sufficiently involved in ISIS media organs could be prosecuted for the crime of 
direct and public incitement to commit genocide before Iraqi courts. 
 
ISIS IDEOLOGY AND ITS EMBEDEDNESS IN JIHĀDI-SALAFĪSM 
The ISIS jihādi campaign is a mixture of Salafīsm and Qutbism.11 The term Salafīsm is a 
form of Islamic revivalism which seeks to bring society back to the practices of the first 
three generations of Muslims, the salaf.12 This idea as well as the rest of the core Salafī 
theological corpus was adopted from the medieval scholar Ibn Taymiyyah (d.1328), a 
controversial figure of his time, who has become one of the most influential medieval 
writers in contemporary Islam.13 According to Taymiyyah the correct method of interpreting 
the Qur’ān was crucial. He attacked what is known as ‘tafsīr al-Qur’ān bi-al-ra’y 
(interpretation based on personal opinion) and contended that even if one arrived thus at the 
true divine meaning of the Qur’ān, such an interpretation would have to be rejected since 
done through the wrong method.14 According to him, one is strictly bound in their 
interpretation of the Qur’ān to the Qur’ān itself, the Sunnah (the Prophet’s acts and words) 
and the interpretations of the salaf considering them more knowledgeable due to their 
proximity to the revelation.15 While the medieval exegetical tradition refused to succumb to 
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such a radical restriction on the authority of the exegete,16 Taymiyyah’s radical 
hermeneutics nevertheless resonates with a segment of the Muslim population. As is the 
case for all Muslims, the fundamental component running through the belief of Salafīsm is 
the doctrine of God’s oneness (tawhīd).17 However Salafīs principally criticise other 
Muslims for what they see as denying tawhīd by corrupting the faith with beliefs and 
practices that are not Islamic. The idea that most Muslims despite professing tawhīd do not 
follow or even understand, it was also espoused by Mohamad bin Abdel Wahhab, the 
founder of the Saudi, and arguably more radical, version of Salafīsm pejoratively called 
Wahhabism.18 In this sense Saudi Salafīsm presented itself as a correction to widespread 
jahiliyyah (ignorance) declaring anyone else an infidel.19 
 
Salafīsm evolved in the twentieth century, with the emergence of Hassan al-Banna’s Society 
of the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn). A legendary speaker himself, Banna 
carefully chose other individuals with oratorical capabilities for high positions within the 
society, created his own press and played heavily on the emotions of people to win support.20 
Most importantly, he organized mass meetings for strengthening loyalties, proclaiming 
aloud the facts of unity, universality, and power and creating an atmosphere of internal 
strength and hostility to the outside world.21 These propaganda techniques were highly 
effective and the Brotherhood became the ideological and institutional epicentre of 
fundamentalism in the Arab sphere and the Islamic world.22 
 
ISIS echo these divisive propaganda techniques and the Salafīst ideology in the aggressive 
assertion that their view is the only pure and authentic interpretation of the worship of God. 
To give legitimacy to this claim they purport to follow the so-called prophetic methodology 
5 
 
(‘ala minhaj al-nubuwwa). They have produced a video on the topic23 and all major 
decisions and laws promulgated are claimed in their press pronouncements, on billboards, 
license plates, stationery and coins to adhere to said methodology.24 Unsurprisingly, they 
also call their political creation the ‘Caliphate upon the prophetic methodology’ and claim 
all the Shari‘āh institutions, therein, training camps, and even the kindergartens are upon 
the methodology of prophethood.25 This propaganda technique serves to close the doors for 
any alternative opinions and interpretations and presents ISIS as infallible, as the only ones 
who follow divine as opposed to man-made laws thereby creating a polarized view of the 
society, whereby you either follow them or you are a kāfir (unbeliever, pl. kuffār).  
 
When the originally peaceful Salafīst concepts were incorporated into the school of jihād, 
the military dimension became essential.26 The adherents of the jihādī-Salafīst movement 
follow a stricter approach to the question of hakimiyyah (ruling in accordance with God’s 
sovereignty) and believe in a duty of declaring unbelief (takfīr) upon those who have 
deviated from this principle, showing an open display of enmity, disavowal and hatred 
towards them and waging jihād (holy war) against them.27 The core aim of the jihādī-
Salafīst movement lies in ‘a revolutionary program of overthrowing un-Islamic regimes in 
the Muslim world, as well as irredentism aiming at expelling non-Muslim military presence 
and influences from Muslim lands.’28 An important event in light of this was the killing of 
Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in 1981 when his assassin shouted: “I have killed the 
Pharaoh, and I do not fear death.”29 The concept of Pharaoh as a paradigm of the evil ruler 
and a prototype of tyranny stems from the book of Exodus for the Judeo-Christian religion.30 
For Muslims, the Pharaoh similarly appears as the ultimate example of the irreligious and 
oppressive ruler whom it is the believers’ duty to disobey and if possible to overthrow.31 In 
the words of Lewis the choice of Pharaoh as the “prototype of tyranny conveys a religious 
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perception of the offense, the judgment, and the punishment executed.”32 The inspiration 
and coordination of Sadat’s assassination came from Abd al-Salam Faraj. In his work The 
Neglected Duty, Faraj called upon fellow Muslims to assassinate their “un-Islamic” leader, 
whom he considered “the near enemy,” in order to establish a truly Islamic caliphate which 
would eventually take on the “far enemy,” i.e. the crusader Americans and the Zionist Jews 
and rule the world.33  
 
As many other contemporary radical Islamist movements, ISIS subscribe to the core jihādī-
Salafīst aims and employ much of the same language when describing the enemy, for 
example Pharaoh for a ruler they perceive to be un-Islamic.34 However the extremeness of 
their approach to jihād and their widespread application of takfīr distinguishes them from 
other radical groups, such as al-Qaeda, and has led also to the killing of thousands of 
civilians at their hands.35  
 
A fundamental part of jihādī-Salafī as well as ISIS ideology is the principle of al-walā’ wa-
l-barā (loyalty and disavowal) in the sense of openly showing animosity towards what is 
non-Islamic. They employ it as a tool for polarising audiences along a strict delineation 
between their construction of Islam and everything and everyone else.36 In essence al-walā’ 
wa-l-barā signifies love and hate or loyalty and disavowal for the sake of God, understood 
as steering away from bid‘ah (heretical innovation in religion), kufr (unbelief) and shirk 
(idolatry or polytheism), i.e. anything that might be non-Islamic be it though, action, 
individual or institution.37 During the first two Saudi states the concept was politicized in 
the sense that it counselled tribes and rulers against seeking the help of non-Muslims. Thus, 
portraying the Ottomans as mushrikūn (idolaters or polytheists) the concept of al-walā’ wa-
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l-barā was developed in an attempt to win the loyalty of wavering Hijazi tribes for al-
Sa’ūd’s reign instead.38 
 
In his famous work Millat Ibrahim (The way of Abraham), Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, 
however, transformed this passive concept into a muscular and aggressive one, requiring a 
series of positive and affirmative acts.39 Apart from Prophet Ibrahim’s acts representing al-
walā’ to God, the example of physically destroying a number of idols surrounding the Ka’ba 
is given as his most important barā from them.40 Maqdisi quoted Hamad ibn ‘Atīq to clarify 
that uttering the Shahādatayn (the two testimonies of faith)41 was not sufficient for a Muslim 
to declare his religion when amongst the unbelievers but in fact he “has not openly declared 
his religion until he opposes every assembly [of disbelief] in whatever disbelief it is famous 
for, while clearly declaring his enmity towards it and his disavowal (barā) from it.”42 Millat 
Ibrahim still enjoys a sustained readership within radical circles and by Maqdisi’s own 
testimony has become the cornerstone of jihādi ideology.43  
 
The radical interpretation of al-walā’ wa-l-barā includes the practice of takfīr, which is an 
act of religious censure depriving a Muslim of their Islamic status based on an accusation 
of kufr, thus making them subject to lawful killing.44 The issue with the practice of takfīr 
lies in its subjectivism, rendering it an extremely dangerous weapon in the hands of fanatical 
sectarians.45 Historically, its use often went beyond the religiously defined ‘unbelief’ and 
served in political, social, or cultural conflicts between individuals or groups.46 
 
Accusations of unbelief and the resultant trials, aimed at monitoring and repressing parties 
opposed to the established theological and political order, began in the second/seventh 
century with the emergence of the Khawārij, who followed a simple principle, namely that 
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anyone disobeying God should automatically be condemned as a kāfir.47 They saw 
themselves as the only real Muslims, branding everyone else as kuffar48 and considered their 
killing permissible.49 Like the Khawārij, ISIS considers resisting a single ruling (hukm) of 
the Shari‘āh as a reason for declaring takfīr and a justification for killing.50 Unsurprisingly, 
they also reject the idea of irjā’ (postponing) as “the most dangerous bid‘ah.”51 This concept 
refers to the call for postponing the question of who is a true Muslim until God’s own 
judgment in the afterlife as humans are not fit to evaluate the faith of another. It was brought 
forward by the Murjia’ah52 who witnessed the bloody massacres between the proto-Sunnis, 
the proto-Shi‘a and the Khawārij.53 ISIS on the other hand praise those who “fight, 
massacre, and terrorize the kuffār while not differentiating between them under the influence 
of irjā’”54 while accusing those practising irjā’ as the ones, who “made Islam into a mere 
claim having no reality.’55  
 
The most infamous declaration of takfīr by the Khawārij was on Caliph ‘Ali for concluding 
an arbitration agreement with Mu‘awiya. 56 The Khawārij argued that by doing so ‘Ali had 
followed human judgment instead of divine judgment thus his action was clearly kufr.57 It 
is hakimiyyah or the doctrine of absolute sovereignty of Allah which dictates that all 
governance is in accordance with the Shari‘āh and not man-made laws, a principle 
rigorously followed by ISIS.  
 
Regarding situations of ruling or judging in accordance with anything other than the 
Shari‘āh, the general Salafī doctrine places importance on whether such governing is 
regarded as being permissible. It distinguishes between major and lesser kufr in this regard, 
whereby somebody is a kāfir in cases where he regards it as being permissible or denies that 
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which Allah has revealed, and in cases of promulgating legislation that goes against the laws 
of Allah.58 In instances of injustice and oppression in individual cases, this is considered to 
be only lesser kufr which does not make one a kāfir, provided that he believes that he is 
sinning and that the ruling of Allah is true.59 While not a major disbelief, this is still a major 
sin, and is worse than many other major sins.60  
 
The Khawārij in comparison considered it a major kufr, even if it was only in a specific 
case, and even if the one who did it, believed that he was disobeying Allah.61 The Khawārij 
cited a precedent for their declaration of takfīr on ‘Ali, namely the murder of the Third 
Caliph, “Uthman. This murder had been justified by declaring that ‘Uthman had ‘broken 
God’s law by not inflicting a penalty prescribed in the Qur’ān.”62  
 
The unbelief is ascribed based on the logic that those who rule by legislation other than 
Shari‘āh usurp the divine attribute of God as ‘the legislator’ (al-Hākim) for themselves and 
are categorised as tyrants who rebel against God and impose this rebellion upon others 
tạwāghı̄t (sing. tạ̄ghūt). They are also considered polytheists (mushrikūn) for making 
themselves as objects that are worshipped, followed and obeyed as partners beside God.63 
If they profess the Islamic faith, they are also hypocrites64 and murtaddūn (apostates, sing. 
murtadd). Furthermore, turning away from the laws of Allah (tabdı̄l shara’ Allāh) and 
conferring upon oneself the authority to make tahḷı̄l and tahṛı̄m (declaring something to be 
either permissible or impermissible in a way that contradicts the divine legislations of God) 
“in and of itself, nullifies Islam.”65  
 
Salafī-jihādīs interpret any sign of secularisation or democracy as major unbelief and 
subsequently rush to declarations of takfīr and jihād on such political regimes and their 
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supporters.66 Islamists tend to refer to Ibn Taymiyyah anti-Mongol fatwa in justifying this 
attitude and have used it as a call to rebellion against the rulers of governments of certain 
modern Muslim countries.67 However according to Yahya Michot, this is a betrayal of the 
medieval scholar’s thought.68 He rather links the fatwas to the Mongol project of invading 
Syria and thus sees it as a call to struggle against a foreign invader (whose newly claimed 
belief in Islam was suspect) and not the struggle against a Muslim ruler who ruled in a 
manner that could be subject to serious reserve or criticism.69 For the latter situation 
Taymiyyah rather commanded patience above all in contrast with the radicals referring to 
him.70  
 
THE HATE PROPAGANDA OF ISIS MEDIA MACHINE 
The above described ideology, embedded in Salafī-jihādism and further radicalized by ISIS 
is spread to their targeted audiences through their sophisticated media machine71 using well-
established propaganda techniques and high quality productions.72 ISIS create daily radio 
and text bulletins, photographic essays and videos alongside official audio statements from 
senior members of the group, including the so-called ‘caliph’ Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and 
the then official spokesperson Abu Mohammad al-Adnani. In ISIS -held territories they are 
controlling several TV stations, distributing DVDs and hard copies of their writings as well 
as showing their videos on big screens in public parks and blasting their radio broadcasts 
through speakers.73 Their media however also reaches beyond these territories. For example, 
Dabiq and Rumiyah are ISIS’s English language online magazines and until early 2018 they 
were freely available to anyone who had access to the worldwide web.74 Their radio station, 
Al-Bayan broadcast in Arabic, Kurdish, English, French and Russian and while FM 
frequencies could be tuned into from neighboring territories it was also available online 
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through links and later even through an app.75 They have been using a variety of social 
media including YouTube, WordPress, Twitter WhatsApp and Telegram among others to 
communicate with recruits and disseminate propaganda materials76 and their own Arabic 
twitter app available through Google Play, called ‘The Dawn of Glad Tidings,’ 
automatically posted ISIS material and links through the accounts of everyone who had 
signed up for it.77  
 
In places under ISIS control one can thus observe an environment where the marketplace of 
ideas has been severely diminished and replaced with a saturation of hate propaganda thus 
creating a fertile ground for its calls to violent action. 
a) Speaking in Vox Dei 
In the theory of Staub, the basic sources of genocide are cultural characteristics and difficult 
life conditions.78 In terms of the former, authoritarian cultures as opposed to those that 
celebrate individual freedom and rights are more susceptible to genocide.79 Secondly, the 
hierarchy of motives of a particular society sets which motives are higher on the list and 
thus easier to ‘make active’ than others.80 And thirdly, culture dictates the identification of 
the enemy.81  
It is clear that ISIS use an extreme reading of the religion for the ‘identification of the 
enemy.’ Furthermore, ISIS ideology fits important characteristics of Muslim culture, 
tradition and society. Unlike in Christian Europe, where religion has taken a back seat to 
mostly secular values, in Muslim societies across the world, religion is still the most 
important aspect of an individuals’ life with an emphasis on avoidance of sin and the 
obedience to God. The name Islam in itself stands for ‘submission to God.’ This indicates a 
culture, not with an acute sense of individual freedom but rather of obedience, albeit not to 
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any worldly figure, but God himself. Radical Islamist narratives cherry-pick excerpts from 
scripture, take them out of their context and burry the significance of central Islamic 
practices82 to manipulate and hijack this noble sentiment (which can also be described as 
one of the main ‘motives’ of the culture), and employ it for less than noble ends.  
 
Using a testimonial persuasion technique, i.e. pretending to speak in Vox Dei,83 ISIS heavily 
lace their narrative with reference to the Qur‘ān, the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad 
as well as numerous Islamic scholars, some more other less known.84 This method of 
persuasion relies on the selective omission of facts and the deliberate mischaracterization 
of events and adversaries and is what transforms hate discourse into hate propaganda.85 In 
the context of ISIS it is ultimately persuasive to a section of the population as it creates the 
illusion that to deny the orders of ISIS would be to deny the orders of Allah. ISIS further 
seek to present an aura of legitimacy by publishing and broadcasting in the name of ‘caliph’ 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi who claims direct descent from the Prophet.  
b) Polarisation of Audiences  
One could categorize ISIS articles, programs, videos and songs according to their different 
topics, however, the polarization of the audience and the creation of a crisis-solution 
dichotomy is the leitmotif that runs through nearly all of them. Thus, already the titles of 
the newspapers Dabiq and Rumiyah convey this message, when understood in light of their 
theological connotations. Dabiq is a small town in Syria, where, according to Islamic 
prophecy the apocalyptic battle against Rome (Christians) will take place. To reiterate the 
location’s importance, every issue begins with a quote by Abū Mus’ab al-Zarqāwī:86 “The 
spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heart will continue to intensify — by Allah’s 
permission — until it burns the crusader armies in Dābiq.” ISIS claim they are fulfilling this 
prophecy by establishing a caliphate and those who join it will be saved whereas all others 
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will “melt as salt melts in water” upon facing him.87 The same idea is hammered in with the 
title of the second issue of the magazine called “The Flood,” whereby the story of Noah is 
used to portray the ISIS caliphate as the arc while anyone failing to join shall be wiped 
away.88 Referencing such events may appear insignificant and merely metaphorical to 
secular audiences, yet a large percentage of the Muslim population believes that they will 
live to see the apocalypse,89 which highlights the importance of conducting an analysis of 
the material thrust into the social sphere by ISIS in light of how their intended audience 
understands its implications. 
 
In Issue 4 of Dābiq, entitled “The Failed Crusade” and bearing an image of the Vatican on 
its cover, al-Zarqāwī90 is quoted as saying: “We perform jihād here while our eyes are upon 
al-Quds. We fight here, while our goal is Rome.”91 He then reassures those skeptical that 
“Allah will grant the Muslims the conquest of Rome, just as Allah’s Messenger (sallallāhu 
‘alayhi wa sallam) promised.”92 His successor Abū Hamzah al-Muhājir further declares that 
“we will not rest from our jihād until we are under the olive trees of Rome, after we destroy 
the filthy house called the White House.”93 After 15 issues and when ISIS lost control over 
Dābiq in a humiliating defeat to Turkish-backed rebels, they renamed the magazine to 
Rumiyah (Rome) in order to avoid reminding the readers of their loss while keeping the 
reference to the same apocalyptic narrative. The fight against “Rome” now represents the 
fight against all Western civilization as a continuation of the ancient Roman Empire, against 
which the early Muslims fought.94 Thus, already the very titles of Dābiq and Rumiyah 
coincide with the group’s genocidal intent as it highlights their aim to eradicate everyone 
outside the realm of their Islamic belief, a vision embodied in their establishment of their 




ISIS thus present the ‘Islamic State’ as the only justified and legitimate political structure 
of the Ummah (Muslim society) and Abu Bakr al Baghdadi as the Amīrul Mu’minīn (the 
Commander of the Faithful). By doing so they present it as a religious duty to pledge 
allegiance to them and migrate to what is described as a ‘glorious’ new caliphate. To them, 
in the name of God, victory is promised which will bring the end of humiliation for the 
Muslims and restore the golden age of Islam.95 With this comes a necessary rejection of 
one’s loyalty to any other group based on tribe, nationality or citizenship.96 
 
Anyone who falls outside the circle of ISIS’s adherents, falls in the camp of kufr (unbelief). 
In Dabiq, Issue 3, al-Zarqāwī puts the readers before a clear choice: “There are only two 
camps: the camp of truth and its followers, and the camp of falsehood and its factions. So, 
choose to be from one of the two camps.”97 This out-group does not merely include the 
traditional targets of Islamist groups such as those of al Qa’eda, i.e. the ‘far enemy’ (the 
crusader West or the communist Russians) and the ‘near enemy’ (secular regimes of Muslim 
majority countries), but also all other religious groups, different Islamic sects, such as the 
Shi‘a, and even other Sunni Muslims. Using derogatory language and names, these groups 
are described, as deviant, wicked, innately hostile to Muslims, and their killing is not only 
described as permissible but as an essential part of practicing the religion and “a form of 
worship” in itself.98  
 
In contrast with the constant denigration of ‘the enemy,’ the articles glorify ISIS fallen 
leaders and fighters, always writing tarahhum99 after their names, referring to them as 
martyrs and their suicide missions as istishhādi operations, i.e. heroic deaths.100 On the other 
hand, active fighters are called ‘knights’ acting to defend Muslim honor101 or more 




In Dabiq, Issue 4, “The failed Crusade”, the then spokesperson for ISIS, Shaykh Abū 
Muhammad al-’Adnānī ash-Shāmī, is quoted adoringly flattering the soldiers: 
 
O soldiers of the Islamic State, what a great thing you have achieved by Allah!... Who 
are you? Who are you O soldiers of the Islamic State? From where have you come? 
What is your secret? Why is it that the hearts of the East and West are dislocated by 
their fear of you? Why is it that the chest muscles of America and its allies shiver out 
of fear of you? 
 
Dabiq interweaves rational- and identity-choice appeals using a variety of narratives. 
According to Ingram, similarly to Al Qaeda’s Inspire magazine, the architects of Dabiq 
strategically generate psychological, existential and socio-political anxieties in the audience 
which is presented with a clear choice between the out-group (tied to the image of crisis) or 
the in-group (tied to the image of solution).102  
c) The Use of Sound and Vision  
Using sound and vision, ISIS push further their divisive narrative as well as their claim of 
fulfilling God’s will. Dabiq and Rumiyah are thus replete with images of scripture and the 
mujāhidīn reading scripture or praying; staged or photoshopped representations of events 
from the Qur’ān or Islamic history; the tawhīd gesture declaring the oneness of God; the 
ISIS flag; actions signifying allegiance to ISIS; ISIS exercising their authority by enforcing 




Furthermore, the magazines are full of images of the ‘far’ and ‘near’ enemies and the 
outcomes of the battles between them and ISIS. High-definition depictions of the most 
abhorrent brutality are not rare, with graphic images of beheadings, the dead bodies of ISIS 
fighters, the damage caused by Coalition-led airstrikes, and mass killings of civilians are 
scattered throughout the magazine. The blame for this misery, which ISIS have largely been 
responsible for creating, is squarely put on the shoulders of the stereotyped and generalized 
out-groups, further stirring up passions of resentment and desire for revenge. The wide 
broadcast of unvarnished violence is furthermore an attempt at desensitizing audiences and 
blunting empathy, attracting individuals to violent action and frightening victims into 
compliance.104  
 
ISIS also use jihādi anashīd as one of their main propaganda techniques either stand-alone 
or as video soundtracks. Anashīd (religious hymns), have always existed in Islam. However, 
during the rise of Islamists movements in the 1970s and 80s, a new form emerged, i.e. jihādi 
nashīd. Islamists in Syria and Egypt used nashīd songbooks, records and cassettes to change 
the public’s interpretation of Islam, while exiled Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood members 
set up youth camps in Saudi Arabia where attendees sung anashīd.105 Some of the anashīd 
written at this time are still used in videos of terrorist organizations today.106  
 
Initially ISIS relied on existing anashīd however they gradually shifted to producing their 
own and founded a specialized unit for this purpose in 2013.107 By 2017, 94 percent of their 
videos used IS-specific anashīd. Since they are less prone to being removed from the web, 




Sang a cappella, producers make the recordings sound more impressive by multi-tracking 
them with digital software, as if there was a multitude of voices singing in perfect harmony. 
Composed in classical Arabic they follow the rules of classical Arabic poetry (qasida).109 
They tend to adhere to a monorhyme and monometer and thus usually have a strong rhythm, 
which suggests a great potential to “hook their listeners.”110 The poetry, repetition and 
engaging rhythm, coupled with the use of themes that are likely to resonate with Sunni 
Muslim audiences on an emotional level, make them a powerful tool for reinforcing 
grievances and motivating violent action. For example, anashīd decrying the current 
weakness of the Ummah are likely to arouse emotions in those that have traditionally viewed 
it as destined for world leadership. Anashīd focusing on a sense of humiliation are likely to 
resonate with younger Muslims, be it those in the Middle East, facing high levels of 
unemployment despite being educated,111 or second or third generation migrants in the West 
experiencing feelings of double non-belonging.112  
 
Staub identified difficult life conditions and the needs and motives that arise from them, as 
one of the main sources of genocide. He sees humiliation as such a life condition.113 
Reflecting on radical Islamism in the 1970s and 1980s, Emmanuel Sivan noted that the 
twentieth century had been particularly hard on Muslim self-esteem; “[a] civilization that 
had always viewed itself as destined for leadership suffered one setback after the other at 
the hands of infidels who now set the pace in all realms of human activity.”114 Several new 




Playing on these emotions, the anashīd present as the only solution to humiliation brutality 
and the waging of war against anyone and anything un-Islamic which offers great pride, 
victory and rewards in heaven.115 An illustrative example is the most famous ISIS nashīd, 
“My Ummah, Dawn has appeared, so await the expected victory.” An excerpt from another 
nashīd “I am not pleased with the life of humiliation” reads: 
 
‘The life of humiliation, no, I am not pleased with it 
And love of death with honour is a desire 
By God, I do not fear death, for the slave has no place in the world, 
For the slave has no place in the world 
For the slave has no place in the world’116  
 
Lemieux and Nill find that melody can increase the ability to convey a message, because 
rhythmic and tonal elements can make it very captivating and addictive, while at the same 
time making the listeners less critical to the message conveyed, by engaging them on an 
emotional level.117 For music with aggressive lyrical themes they found that it demonstrates 
“the potential to increase aggressive thoughts, feelings, and potentially behaviors among 
listeners.”118 In the context of radicalism across different ideologies, Pieslak found abundant 
examples of music’s pivotal function, from recruitment strategies to engendering a culture 
of militancy and motivating action.119 
 
It is exactly the ability of music to evoke emotions that has made anashīd problematic in 
the eyes of Wahhabis. They take a suspicious stance towards anashīd because they see them 
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as a distraction from studying and listening to the Qur’ān.120 On the other hand, the Muslim 
Brotherhood is more relaxed on music. The jihādi movement, taking inspiration from both, 
uses music extensively, however only following the strict Salafīst conditions placed on it.121  
 
The anashīd play an important role in creating a sense of community. ISIS videos clearly 
document nashīd sessions in which jihādis recite anashīd together as well as da‘wa 
(preaching Islam) events involving considerable live recitation.122 Behnam Said notes that 
they are a common cultural asset which connect people all over the globe and therefore are 
a valuable tool in creating a global jihādi community.123 ISIS group-specific anashīd 
furthermore reflect its distinct political identity as a state.124 By replacing the existing 
Islamic anashīd with their own productions, IS signalled the beginning of a new era which 
demands the purging of all cultural items contaminated by anything non-ISIS, reflecting the 
dominant Muslim imagination which projects a binary between Islam and jahiliyyah.125  
 
Another powerful tool employed by ISIS in its propaganda efforts is the use of skilfully 
produced videos. The videos professionally reflect the format of modern Western action 
movie trailers or video games, where violence is depicted as exciting entertainment and any 
negative impact in terms of human suffering is left out of the picture, desensitizing viewers 
to the violence. Accompanying the images are typical movie trailer sound effects skilfully 




A good example of this is one of the most professionally produced videos, the “Flames of 
War” produced by Al Hayat Media Centre.126 Its first part depicting ‘the crisis’ is filled with 
classic cinematic tension build-up sound effects, creating anxiety in the audience, which is 
then soothed with the introduction of the calming sound of the nashīd. Finally, the built-up 
anxiety is released through ‘the solution,’ i.e. depictions of ISIS violence against the enemy.  
d) Negative Stereotyping and Generalisation 
In order to incite to genocide, ISIS employ the technique of extreme negative stereotyping in 
a somewhat complex fashion using religious justification. Unlike the Nazi genocide with its 
at least theoretically manageable target of exterminating the Jewish and other minority 
populations, and the Rwandan genocide focusing only on the Tutsis, ISIS makes its target the 
vast majority of the world’s population. While tempting to do so, it would be over simplistic 
to describe ISIS narratives on the out-group as dehumanizing. Although certainly denying any 
dignity to the people belonging to these groups, they are not dehumanizing them, since in their 
perception humanity holds no value per se. People are not intrinsically worthy of respect and 
nothing of human origin is of value or importance, but rather characterized as bid‘ah or shirk. 
Human emotions, apart from those in reference to God, equally hold no importance. A human 
only gains value by becoming a slave to God, following the rules of Shari‘āh and spreading 
the realm of Islam by jihād. In this sense they also render the intrinsic morality of a human to 
be flawed, thus any sympathy an ISIS follower may feel for the kuffar should be suppressed 
and replaced by the adherence of strict IS rules which dictate their killing ‘wherever possible.’ 
An example of suppressing natural instincts of humanity and compassion is clear in Rumiyah, 
Issue 1, where a picture of a seemingly kind and smiling seller of flowers is accompanied with 
the caption “Even the blood of a merry Crusader citizen selling flowers to passers-by [is 




The out-group, is termed by ISIS “the camp of kufr, riddah [apostasy] and hypocrisy,” “the 
camp of the Jews, the crusaders, their allies, and with them the rest of the nations and 
religions of kufr, all being led by America and Russia”128 or the civilization of shirk, the 
civilization of riba (usury) and prostitution, the civilization of humiliation and 
subjugation.129 Within are different sub-groups distinguished by what ISIS present as their 
respective lack of belief in the Islamic religion. Each holding a specific connotation, ISIS 
use several names for these groups, many times bearing a deeply derogatory meaning from 
a (Sunni) Muslim perspective such as, the murtaddūn, the mushrikūn, the crusaders, the 
innovators,130 the rebellious,131 the hypocrites,132 the quasi-jihādists, mock mujāhidīn, the 
tawāghīt and their followers, the Rāfidah (the rejectors), etc.   
 
There is at least in theory a hierarchy between the groups. Based on the teachings of Ibn 
Taymiyyah and Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd-al-Wahhab, ISIS categorize disbelief and polytheism 
from the most to the least severe. Thus, the refusal to excommunicate Satan, or claiming to 
be a deity, as well as worshiping them is at the top of the list. Wrongly described as devil-
worshippers,133 the Yazidis thus fall into this category. The next category are pagans, 
Christians, Jews and anyone that has ‘deviated’ from Islam, while other categories consist 
of those who are simply ‘immoral’ or do not pray.134 In Dabiq 9, a further hierarchy between 
the Christians and the Jews is explained: “because the kāfir Christians did not curse Prophet 
‘Īsā (‘alayhis-salām) nor accuse his virtuous mother of sin, they were made to humiliate the 




Below we thus examine the meanings behind the names given to specific groups on IS’s 
list of enemies and the main IS narratives on them in light of the relevant context which 
clearly convey direct incitement to genocide. 
 
ISIS CATEGORY OF THE DEVIL – WORSHIPPERS: YAZIDI 
Yazidis are considered to be one of the oldest ethnic groups in Mesopotamia.136 They 
identify themselves, not merely in terms of ethnicity but also in terms of religion. Their 
monotheistic belief emanate from a mixture of other religions including Christianity, 
Shamanism and Zoroastrianism.137 For centuries and long before the emergence of ISIS, the 
misinterpretation of this belief, has made the community a target of genocidal language and 
violence.138 For example, the Ottomans constantly subjected them to forced conversions139 
and those who rejected such religious assimilation suffered violence or even death.140 In the 
Ottoman archives and unofficial documents one can find the characterisation of Yazidis as a 
“pervert community,” “looters’ and ‘bandits who do not pay their taxes.”141 Furthermore, 
they are described as the “descendants of Yezid bin Muaviye”142 (647-683 A.D.), the second 
caliph of the Umayyad dynasty, known as the perpetrator of Karbala Incident and thus an 
utterly disliked figure among Shi‘a, ‘Alawites and Sunni Muslims. ISIS continue to ascribe 
this lineage to the Yazidis, despite the name having nothing to do with Yazid, but rather 
deriving from the Farsi word "ized", which means angel or deity. The name Izidis simply 
means "worshippers of god," which is how Yazidis describe themselves.143  
 
In Dabiq 4, ISIS brand the Yazidis an “originally mushrik group,” i.e. polytheists (mushrikūn) 




the worship of Iblīs [devil] who they [Yazidis] consider to be a fallen but forgiven 
angel amongst the angels who were ordered to prostrate to Ādam! He alone refused 
to prostrate to Ādam, and they consider this arrogant disobedience of Allah to be his 
noblest deed! They consider him to be misunderstood by mankind! They consider 
him to be good and enlightened, and claim that Allah will openly forgive him on 
Judgment Day after already forgiving him beforehand for crying tears of piety over 
a period of thousands of years! So they have made Iblīs – who is the biggest tāghūt 
– the symbolic head of enlightenment and piety! What arrogant kufr can be greater 
than this?144 
 
Here ISIS are taking actual elements of the Yazidi religion and distort them in order to 
portray the group as devil-worshippers and stir up disgust for them amongst the Muslim 
population. While in fact monotheists, Yazidis believe in the angel Melek Taus whose story 
resembles that of Satan, however, according to their belief he is not the devil but rather has 
become an intermediary between God and humanity after having reconciled with God. In 
the extremist ISIS view on the world however, there is only space for one interpretation 
and meaning of the story and Yazidis display the biggest kufr by understanding it in their 
own way. In the words of ISIS, the “continual existence [of Yazidis] to this day is a matter 
that Muslims should question as they will be asked about it on Judgment Day, considering 
that Allah had revealed Āyat as-Sayf (the verse of the sword) over 1400 years ago.”145 
 
With this ISIS makes a clear call to genocide as they present to their followers the 
destruction of the Yazidi group as a religious duty of utmost importance. The destruction 
however is not focused on the Yazidi as an ethnic group but as a religious group, thus 
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conversion to Islam is offered as a way out of death and even the sexual enslavement of 
Yazidi women and children is presented as a way to the eventual conversion of the group to 
Islam.146 This does not however make their aim any less genocidal as “protecting against 
forced religious conversions safeguards the very existence of certain human groups and 
endorses elementary principles of morality. By including religious groups within the 
Convention's protections, the drafters reveal their intent that protecting religious beliefs is 
of paramount importance.”147  
 
ISIS CATEGORY OF THE PAGAN CHRISTIANS (NASSARAH, NAZARENE) 
In Dabiq ISIS refers to their fuqahā’ (scholars) to explain how each out-group should be 
dealt with. Thus the fuqahā’ indicated that Jews and Christians could pay jizyah (religious 
tax) and continue their existence within the Caliphate.148 On the contrary for the Yazidis as 
‘original mushrikūn’ there was no room for such an arrangement.149 This official narrative 
of IS has lead the United Nations Human Rights Council to conclude that IS do not intend 
to eradicate Christians, as they do the Yazidis, but instead offer to protect and respect them 
through the traditional Islamic option of entering a dhimmah covenant of security and safety 
and paying the jizya (religious tax).150 Yet interviews with the Christian leaders directly 
involved with negotiations with ISIS reveal that the claims of this option are a “deception 
and a propaganda ploy” more akin to extortion than the 7th century Pact of Omar according 
to which the community paid a progressive tax, in exchange for the protection of their 
families’ lives and property and for their religious rights.151 Dabiq 15 furthermore makes it 
clear that it is not enough to pay the jizya but that the Christians have to live under the 
authority of Islam in humiliation and even so, ISIS declare “we would continue to hate you 
[the Christians].”152 They furthermore stipulate that the hatred is a religious duty based first 
and foremost on the ‘disbelief’ of the Christians for rejecting the oneness of Allah by making 
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partners for him in worship, a reference to the concept of the Holy Trinity.153 For this, they 
declare the Christians to be pagans and polytheists and this shirk makes them a legitimate 
target to be killed.154 Secondly the hatred is based on Christian societies being secular, 
liberal and nationalistic and permitting what “Allah has prohibited while banning many of 
the things He has permitted.”155 Western foreign policy is only further down on the list of 
reasons for hatred which the article makes explicitly clear: 
 
What’s important to understand here is that although some might argue that your 
foreign policies are the extent of what drives our hatred, this particular reason for 
hating you is secondary… The fact is, even if you were to stop bombing us, 
imprisoning us, torturing us, vilifying us, and usurping our lands, we would continue 
to hate you because our primary reason for hating you will not cease to exist until you 
embrace Islam.156 
 
Dabiq explains that any halt to the IS war against Christians can only be temporary, until 
all Christians convert to Islam.157 The inviolability of their blood in cases of a dhimmah 
contract would be an exceptional ruling, and whenever that ruling is terminated – either due 
to their violation of the covenant, or due to the expiry of the duration of the covenant – “their 
blood would go back to the default ruling of it being permissible to shed.”158  
 
The genocidal intent of ISIS propaganda is also evident from their video depicting the 
slaughter of Christians in Libya and Ethiopia and the destruction of churches, crosses and 




To the nation of the cross, we are back again… Muslim blood that was shed under the 
hands of your religion is not cheap. We swear to Allah… you will not have safety 
even in your dreams until you embrace Islam.159  
 
Despite describing Western foreign policy as a “less important” factor, IS seek to arouse 
hatred in their targeted audience for all Christians exactly by stereotyping them and 
presenting them as the coalition forces and crusaders. This way, absurdly, even Coptic 
Christians from Egypt get branded crusaders before being slaughtered: 
 
Oh people, recently you've seen us on the hills of Al-Sham [Greater Syria] and 
on Dabiq's Plain, chopping off the heads that had been carrying the cross delusion for 
a long time, filled with spite against Islam and Muslims, and today we… are sending 
another message: Oh crusaders, safety for you will be only wishes especially when 
you're fighting us all together, therefore we will fight you all together until the war 
lays down its burdens and Jesus peace be upon him will descend, breaking the cross, 
killing the swine. The sea you have hidden Sheikh Osama bin Laden's body in, we 
swear to Allah we will mix it with your blood.160 
 
In Dabiq 9, Christians are presented as those who ‘plot’ against Muslims in an apparent 
accusation in mirror,161 while Baghdadi dispels any possibility of a peaceful coexistence 
between Muslims and Christians saying:  
 
O Muslims! Whoever thinks that it is within his capacity to conciliate with the 
Jews, Christians, and other kuffār, and for them to conciliate with him, such that he 
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coexists with them and they coexist with him while he is upon his religion and 
upon tawhīd, then he has belied the explicit statement of his Lord.162 
 
Furthermore, Dabiq 7 leaves little doubt as to the instructions to their followers regarding 
the treatment of this group when it states: “We will argue, before Allah, against any Muslim 
who has the ability to shed a single drop of crusader blood but does not do so.”163 Dabiq 15 
makes it clear that while Christians are being dragged by ISIS “further and further into a 
swamp” they are offered a way out by way of conversion to Islam164 while Rumiyah, Issue 
9, sanctions the slavery of Christian women and children.165 From the above it is clear, that 
the future IS propagates for the Christian communities is much like that of the Yazidi, i.e. 
their destruction. 
  
In 2016, the European Parliament unanimously passed a resolution recognizing the rapes, 
murders, kidnappings, enslavement and dispossessions of Christians, Yazidi and other 
religious minorities by ISIS as genocide as did later the US House of Representatives and 





The cover of Dabiq, Issue 15, shows an image of the destruction of the main Christian 
symbol of faith. 
 
ISIS CATEGORY OF APOSTATES: THE SHI‘A, ‘ALAWITES, DURŪZ AND 
ISMĀ‘ĪLIYYAH, THE SAHWĀT AND THE FOLLOWERS OF THE TĀGHŪT  
The apostate group, according to ISIS, includes amongst others the Rāfidah/Safawi 
(pejoratively referring to Shi‘a Muslims), Nusayriyyah (pejoratively referring to ‘Alawites), 
Durūz (Druze community), Ismā’īliyyah (branch of Shi‘a Islam) and followers of the 
tawāghīt.167 According to the ISIS fuqahā’, unlike the mushrikūn, the “apostate” groups 




The Shi‘a are arguably one of the main targets of IS hatred and aggression, which does not 
reflect only the sectarian divide between the Sunni and Shi‘a but also the hostility found 
across the spectrum of the Salafī ideology towards the Shi‘a beliefs.169 The former Grand 
Mufti of Saudi Arabia, ‘Abd al-‘Aziz bin Baz stated that every sect of Shi‘a has forms of 
bid‘ah170 and contradicts the Islamic way called by the Prophet Muhammad.171 Zarqāwī 
declared all Shi‘a apostates and publicly announced that their “perfidy engraved in the 
forehead of history.”172 Dabiq 13, refers to more than twenty scholars who allegedly made 
takfīr of the Shi‘a.173 
 
ISIS refer to Shi‘a as Rāfidah, or the rejecters, a derogatory term dating back to the 
Umayyad dynasty used on account of the Shi‘a refusal to recognize the first three caliphs as 
legitimate. Shi‘ism is presented as a plot by a Jew174 and their awaited Messiah as the Dajjāl, 
i.e. the false messiah or the great deceiver – the most dangerous figure in Islamic 
eschatology (theology concerning the end of the world): 
 
The closer the Hour approaches, the more the Rāfidah fall in line with the Jews in 
preparation for the appearance of this awaited evil leader. Upon reading the Rāfidī 
account of the ‘Mahdī,’ it becomes clear that he is none other than the Dajjāl.175 
 
One can furthermore observe classic hate propaganda techniques of depicting a people in 
animal terms. “The Rāfidah are the insurmountable obstacle, the lurking snake, the scorpion 
of deception and malice, the prowling enemy, the deadly poison.”176 The Shi‘a are also 
stereotyped as Safawiyyah, a term associated by Sunnis with any expansionist Shi‘a groups 
acting against Sunnis or their interests.177 In the article “Know your Enemy: Who Were the 
Safawiyyah?” ISIS presents them as a group started by a Sufi order “which transformed into 
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a militant Rāfidī movement to become a tyrannical state that subdued Persia with ambitions 
to wipe out all traces of the Sunnah and its people.”178 Today’s Shi‘a are presented as the 
continuation of this ‘cult’ propagating Persianism and allying with the crusaders.179 
 
Nibras Kazimi traces the current intensified Sunni hostility towards the Shi‘a to a book 
supposedly written by a Syrian member of the Muslim Brotherhood in which he claimed 
that the Iranian revolution was only in part about the revival of Shi‘a Islam while the rest 
was about restoring Zoroastrianism, which threatens Islamic and Arabic culture.180 This is 
reflected in another name ISIS use for the Shi‘a, i.e. the Majūs, a pejorative term for 
Zoroastrians, who despite being the first monotheists were wrongfully branded by Islamists 
as “fire worshippers” due to their belief that fire represents God’s light or wisdom.181 Dabiq 
also features an image of a Shi‘a shrine dedicated to Piruz Nahawandi, termed in Arabic 
Abū Lu‘lu‘ah al-Majūsī, a Sasasian general revered by the Shi‘a but hated by the Sunni due 
to his assassination of Caliph Umar who was holding him captive.182 The ‘al-Majūsī’ 
indicates that the Sunnis consider him to be a Zoroastrian. The reference to his shrine is an 
apparent attempt to tap into historical resentments and mainstream Sunni sentiments as 
many Sunni scholars have called the shrine offensive and un-Islamic and have demanded 
its destruction.183 It is also important to note that the term Majūs was used for Iranians as 
part of Iraqi propaganda already in the 1980s during the Iraq-Iran war to depict Iranians as 
not real Muslims.  
 
In sum, ISIS portray Shi‘a as apostates, that worship the dead and other forms of kufr and 
shirk and claim they have “nothing to do with Islam other than to deter the people from 
it.”184 In another classic case of ‘accusation in mirror’ IS claim the Shi‘a have a tradition of 
hatred towards the Ahlus-Sunnah (Sunnis) and aim to eradicate them and replace them with 
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a population of apostasy.185 This talk can easily fall on fertile ground as within the last 
decade, polls have found that at least 40 percent of Sunni Muslims from five Middle Eastern 
and North African countries did not recognise the Shi‘a as true Muslims.186 Exploiting this 
collective sectarianist view allowed IS to ally themselves with other Sunni militant groups 
with which it had previously been fighting.187 Thus, this demonization also serves as a 
unifier through hatred of the ‘other’.188  
 
Numerous other groups fall under the catch-all category of ‘apostates’ due to their beliefs 
such as the ‘Alawites, Durūz and Ismā’īliyyah. Still other groups fall under this category 
due to their political orientation, despite professing a Sunni belief. As mentioned above, any 
ruler embracing nationalistic or even democratic ideas as opposed to pure Shari‘āh is named 
a tāghūt and their followers murtaddūn. For example, in Dabiq 6, a picture of Egyptian 
soldiers holds the caption: “The murtadd soldiers of Egypt’s new Pharaoh,”189 while a 
picture of Jordanian pilots meeting the king holds the caption: “The murtaddūn meet the 
tāghūt of Jordan.”190 After IS had shot down a Jordanian plane and captured its pilot, Dabiq 
ran an interview with him. Instead of his name, Muath al-Kasasbeh, the word murtadd 
appeared before every answer he gave, in a clear propaganda technique of relentless 
repetition of the derogatory term to achieve the desired effect on the audience.191 
 
Even the modern Muslim Brotherhood get the name “The Murtadd Brotherhood” on the 
front cover of Dabiq, Issue 14.192 Inside readers are told the Ikhwān (Brotherhood) is:  
 
nothing but a secularist party with an ‘Islamic’ cloak… the wickedest of the 
secularists…[a] party that worships seats and parliaments… a party that would 
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prostrate to Iblīs if it were required to achieve seats… a party of extreme apostasy and 
… it is thus obligatory upon the Muslims to declare the stance of takfīr, barā’ah, 
animosity, and enmity towards this group and its members193 
 
In other words, no better than devil-worshippers, the Muslim Brotherhood is at the receiving 
end of ISIS hatred due to the Brotherhood embracing democratic procedures and legislation 
as in their ideology this goes against the hakimiyya.194 The Taliban are also condemned for 
their murtadd nationalism, their ‘superficial application’ of the Shari‘āh their support for 
kāfir systems and embracing of tawāghit.195 
 
Since political affiliation is not one of the categories defining protected groups under the 
Genocide Convention, one might conclude that the targeting of the supposed tawāghit and 
their followers could not fall under the definition of the crime of genocide. However, since 
ISIS themselves do not distinguish between the political and the religious and target these 
people as ‘apostates,’ their persecution nevertheless falls under ‘religious.’ As far as the 
framing of the protected groups is concerned there has been a shift in international 
jurisprudence from an objective understanding to a combination of objective and subjective 
criteria.  The ICTR thus considered both self-perception (self-identification by the group) 
and perception (identification by others) as criteria for defining a people as a protected group 
under the Genocide Convention.196   
 
Much attention of ISIS is also dedicated to the disdain of the so-called Sahwāt (Awakening). 
A fairly modern term, it has its roots in the war in Iraq where it was used for local Sunni 
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tribes which collaborated with the US forces against al-Zarqāwī and the Al-Qaeda in Iraq, 
the precursor to ISIS. The term is now used by ISIS to denote all Sunni ‘traitors,’ who do 
not support ISIS and fight against them.197 According to the black and white ISIS logic, this 
makes them also apostates.  
 
All these categorizations of people as kuffar and their rejection and persecution follow from 
the aggressive interpretation of the concept of al-walā’ wa-l-barā, a fundamental part of 
ISIS ideology, and its many implications described above. As mentioned, ISIS are far more 
radical in their use of takfīr than other Islamist groups. Thus in Dabiq, ISIS strongly criticise 
Al Qaeda, and their leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, for not making takfīr of the Shi‘a in general, 
but only on account of their support of America in their aggression towards the Sunnis.198 
Likewise, they are criticised for not making takfīr on the supporters of the tawāghit except 
for those officers who torture Muslims and belong to some specific departments of National 
Security.199 While Zawahiri refuses to declare takfīr on these groups of Muslims due to their 
‘ignorance,’ ISIS strongly oppose this option.200 ISIS also criticise Zawahiri for not issuing 
a blanket condemnation on anyone resisting any Shari‘āh laws, while they make it clear that 
the slightest disobedience to the Shari‘āh would be met with a declaration of apostasy and 
the subjugation to killings, enslavement and the taking of wealth.201   
 
As with most totalitarian movements, the ISIS idea of purging the society through the 
practice of takfīr reached absurd proportions, when a fatwa was issued on 17th May 2017 
with “the second most important seal” in ISIS, i.e. the Delegated Committee which is 
directly subordinate to Baghdadi. The ruling declared “making of takfīr of the mushrikin as 
one of the utmost principles of the religion, which must be known before knowing the prayer 
and other obligations that are known of the religion by necessity.”202 By elevating takfīr to 
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a principle of the religion, they essentially declared takfīr on any Muslim, who failed to 
exercise takfīr on others.203 In contrast, the Grand Mufti and one of the first jihādist 
ideologues supporting Baghdadi’s caliphate, Turki Al-Bin’ali himself rejected the fatwa and 
said it would have led to an ‘endless chain of takfīr’ denouncing as unbelievers even 
adamant takfīrists such as al-Zarqāwī and Abu Muhammad al Adnani, who refrained from 
declaring takfīr on all Muslims who did not follow their ways.204 After publishing it in 
Rumiyah and Al Naba, ISIS eventually rescinded the ruling in an effort to quell the 
controversy and released numerous lectures through Al Bayan radio, cross-promoted by Al 
Naba proclaiming that takfīr was in fact not a principle of the religion but merely an 
obligation and that ‘ignorance’ was a sufficient excuse for failing to excommunicate other 
Muslims in some cases.205 Furthermore he made it clear that it is permissible to refrain from 
takfīr in the lightest forms of disbelief, i.e. when Muslims are merely ‘immoral’ or not 
praying.206 
 
PLACING ISIS RHETORIC IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW 
Incitement to hatred/hate propaganda has been dealt with in the international criminal 
jurisprudence since the Nazi propagandist Julius Streicher was found guilty of crimes 
against humanity by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT), while another 
propagandist, Hans Fritzsche, was acquitted. Since then the United Nations Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) established the 
international crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide.207 This crime was 
incorporated verbatim into the statutes of the ICTY (1993) and the ICTR (1994), while the 
ICC statute (2002), in respect of the crime of genocide, established individual criminal 




While publicly uttered hate speech falling short of direct incitement to commit genocide did 
not get its own specific provision in any of the statutes, it can still be considered criminal if 
it amounts to instigation, aiding and abetting209 or participation in a joint criminal 
enterprise210 in relation to any of the enumerated crimes in the statutes. For the establishment 
of liability in these instances, a causal link is necessary between the speech and subsequent 
crimes committed, while such a link is not necessary in terms of incitement to genocide.211 
 
In Nahimana and more recently in Šešelj the ICTR and ICTY respectively established that 
hate speech can per se constitute persecution as a crime against humanity, when there is 
discrimination in fact and the denial of a fundamental right, such as the right to dignity or 
the right to security.212  
 
THE ELEMENTS OF DIRECT AND PUBLIC INCITEMENT TO GENOCIDE 
In Nahimana et al. the Appeal Judgment defines the elements of direct and public incitement 
to genocide as follows: 
A person may be found guilty of the crime specified in Article 2(3)(c) of the Statute if 
he or she directly and publicly incited the commission of genocide (the material 
element or actus reus) and had the intent directly and publicly to incite others to commit 





The public element of incitement is satisfied when call for criminal action is communicated 
to the public at large, for example, through means of mass communication.214 It is clear that 
IS more than satisfy this element by spreading their propaganda relentlessly through 
numerous means and channels, as explained above. The other element of the actus reus is 
whether the call for criminal action is direct. In this regard, the Akayesu Trial Judgment 
made it clear that:  
 
the direct element of incitement should be viewed in the light of its cultural and 
linguistic content. Indeed, a particular speech may be perceived as ‘direct’ in one 
country, and not so in another, depending on the audience... incitement may be direct, 
and nonetheless implicit… The Chamber will … consider on a case-by-case basis 
whether, in light of the culture … and the specific circumstances of the instant case, 
acts of incitement can be viewed as direct or not, by focusing mainly on the issue of 
whether the persons for whom the message was intended immediately grasped the 
implication thereof.215  
 
In Nahimana et al. the Appeals Chamber confirmed this approach and noted that it had been 
adopted in several other judgements and by the Supreme Court of Canada in Mugesera.216 
The Chamber further stated that “the principal consideration is thus the meaning of the 
words used in the specific context: it does not matter that the message may appear 




ISIS narrative is laced with explicit calls for killing and destruction,218 which would be 
clearly understood as such by any culture around the globe. For example the statement in 
Issue 13 of Dabiq referring to the Shi‘a: “the Rāfidah… must be killed wherever they are to 
be found, until no Rāfidī walks on the face of earth.”219 
 
However, taking into consideration the particular context, culture and ideology, these are 
not the only statements which their audience ‘immediately grasps’ as direct calls for 
extermination. Every time ISIS describe an individual or group as apostate, this is 
undisputedly understood by their followers as a call to kill. While there is some controversy 
in the Muslim community as to whether Shari‘āh prescribes a worldly punishment for 
apostasy, there is no doubt in the jihādi-Salafī ideology that the punishment is death.220 It is 
exactly for this reason that declarations of takfīr in itself, without a need for any further 
explanations of what this implies, are perceived for their inherent danger of inciting violence 
and an effort to legislate against them has been taking place in Tunisia and Iraq.221 
 
On the other hand, for anyone branded an original polytheist, such as the Yazidi, for jihādī-
Salafīs the verse of the sword will apply, undoubtedly perceived by their audience as 
essentially the same instruction, that is, to kill. There is some room for enslavement and 
forcible conversion, when it comes to so-called original polytheists; however, this falls 
squarely under the destruction of a community, its culture and religion, regarded by some 
to fall under the definition of genocide.222  
 
Furthermore, several statements advocate for a ‘genocidal rape’ campaign against Yazidi 
women. Issue 4 of Dabiq magazine, “The Failed Crusade” asserted that “enslaving the 
families of the kuffār and taking their women as concubines is a firmly established aspect of 
the Shari‘āh that if one were to deny or mock, he would be denying or mocking the verses of 
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the Qur’ān and the narrations of the Prophet and thereby apostatizing from Islam.”223 One of 
the aims of these rapes is to produce Muslim children out of Yazidi women. This is clear from 
the justifications for the rapes given by ISIS, when they describe as a sign of the end times 
that “the slave girl gives birth to her master,” i.e. based on the father’s religion the child will 
be a Muslim, and thus the master of the non-Muslim mother. 224  These calls constitute direct 
and public incitement to commit genocidal rape as recognized by the ICTR in its Akayesu 
Judgment which concluded that even those rapes that do not result in the death of the victim 
could constitute genocide where “[s]exual violence was a step in the process of destruction of 
the … group—destruction of the spirit, of the will to live, and of life itself.” 225  As in the 
Rwandan example, the rapes of Yazidi women resulted not only in their psychological 
destruction, but also of their families and their communities.  
 
Furthermore, in Nahimana et al. the Appeal Chamber noted that, “while it is not necessary 
to prove that the pronouncements in question had actual effects, the fact that they did have 
such effects can be an indication that the receivers of the message understood them as direct 
incitement to commit genocide.”226 Widespread killings, rapes and acts of genocide have 
been attempted and committed by followers of ISIS, which additionally indicates that their 
propaganda is perceived as a call for such actions.   
 
For example, in June 2016 the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the 
Syrian Arab Republic submitted their report to the United Nations Human Rights Council 
which found a genocidal campaign orchestrated by ISIS against the Yazidis’ by 
demonstrating that the five enumerated acts of genocide have been materialized by ISIS:  
 
ISIS has sought to destroy the Yazidis through killings; sexual slavery, enslavement, 
torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and forcible transfer causing serious 
bodily and mental harm; the infliction of conditions of life that bring about a slow 
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death; the imposition of measures to prevent Yazidi children from being born, including 
forced conversion of adults, the separation of Yazidi men and women, and mental 
trauma; and the transfer of Yazidi children from their own families and placing them 
with ISIS fighters, thereby cutting them off from beliefs and practices of their own 
religious community, and erasing their identity as Yazidis. The public statements and 
conduct of ISIS and its fighters clearly demonstrate that ISIS intended to destroy the 
Yazidis of Sinjar, composing the majority of the world’s Yazidi population, in whole 
or in part.227   
 
As mentioned above, in terms of the mens rea, the Appeal Chamber in Nahimana et al. 
established that it requires the intent directly and publicly to incite others to commit 
genocide, which in itself presupposes a genocidal intent.228 
 
While unveiling the intention behind the ISIS general narrative and their particular 
statements, one should employ much of the same considerations as for determining whether 
the calls for criminal action were direct. That is, the cultural and ideological contexts as 
well as the context of any criminal acts being carried out while the message was 
disseminated. In Nahimana et al. the Appeals Chamber thus noted that “the fact that a 
speech leads to acts of genocide could be an indication … that this was indeed the intent of 
the author of the speech.”229 
 
The religious and ideological contexts of ISIS publications and broadcasts as analysed in 
this chapter clearly demonstrate the requisite mens rea for direct and public incitement as 
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does the fact that these messages were disseminated while religious minorities were actively 
being targeted and killed on the basis of their membership in religious groups.230 The 
praising and glorification of such attacks and attackers in the relevant newspapers, videos 
and radio stations, furthermore indicates the necessary intent.231 
 
One should furthermore not overlook the fact that groups such as the Yazidis, Christians 
and Shi‘a have been subject to widespread and systematic violence in the region in the past. 
This likewise indicates the intent of the propagandists to incite the commission of further 
crimes against these groups. The promotion of the destruction of minorities’ places of 
worship and other cultural objects of significance to their existence as distinct groups is 
likewise an indicator of the intent to incite to genocide.232  
 
HATE DISCOURSE SURROUNDING THE DIRECT AND PUBLIC INCITEMENT TO 
COMMIT GENOCIDE AS ITS ESSENTIAL CONTEXT 
In Nahimana the Prosecutor sought a characterization of the crime of direct and public 
incitement to commit genocide as a continuing crime, since an accused embarks upon a 
course directed towards inciting, or instigating genocide, with every discrete act which is 
done in the pursuit of that goal necessarily building upon and renewing the preceding acts 
done for the same purpose.233 In the particular case the Prosecution thus sought a conviction 
based on the totality of the articles published in Kangura and the totality of RTLM 
broadcasts for forming part of a continuous transaction calculated to incite genocide.234 The 
Appeals Chamber did not consider it necessary to decide whether the totality of said articles 
and broadcasts could constitute one continuing incitement to commit genocide, however it 
emphasized that an accused cannot be convicted simply on the basis of “programming” in 
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general but only on the basis of clearly identified specific acts of direct and public 
incitement:235  
 
It appears from the travaux préparatoires of Genocide Convention that only specific 
acts of direct and public incitement to commit genocide were sought to be criminalized 
and not hate propaganda or propaganda tending to provoke genocide.236 
 
Despite this, the Appeals chamber made it clear that context is a factor to consider in 
deciding whether the relevant discourse constitutes direct incitement to commit genocide 
and that uttered speech which does not by itself amount to this crime can nevertheless 
provide such a context.237 As other contextually important information, it could explain how 
the listeners perceived the relevant speech and the impact the speech may have had.238  
 
The Appeals Chamber acknowledged that ‘[i]n most cases, direct and public incitement to 
commit genocide can be preceded or accompanied by hate speech’ that is not prohibited as 
such under Art. 2(3)(c) of the Statute.239 In fact, more than merely ‘accompanying’ or 
‘preceding’ genocide, history shows that extensive and systematic hate rhetoric which forms 
part of a persuasion campaign aimed at the relevant audience, is a sine qua non of a 
successful genocidal campaign. A direct and public incitement to genocide uttered in a 
vacuum, absent of a prior hate propaganda, would fall on unfertile ground and never reach 
the stage of prosecution at any international criminal tribunal. In this sense, it is not merely 





Our analysis shows that ISIS narrative covers all three components found in hate discourse 
that motivates and justifies violence, i.e. negative stereotyping; presenting the group as an 
extreme threat to the well-being of the in-group; and the eliminationist solution in its most 
radical form, i.e. calls for killing and rape.240 
 
ISIS rhetoric is not only embedded in the existing culture, geo-political situation of the 
region in which they operate and the religious ideology of violent jihādi groups that 
preceded them, but is also an important influence on all three that will outlive the group 
itself to inspire the ideological framework of the next generation of mass-murderers.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Tapping into mainstream emotions found across different Sunni Muslim communities, ISIS 
use negative stereotyping and labelling of the out-group to drive existing dislikes to hatred 
which arouses passion for revenge and aggression and a numbness towards the killing of 
the victim.241 Such hate is found at the extreme end of a scale that runs from dislike, through 
animosity to outright hatred and it is negative stereotyping that leads to a move on this scale 
from less towards more negative emotions.242 With their elimination of the grey zone243 they 
furthermore seek to undermine non-violent modes of conflict management and instead 
unabashedly and relentlessly openly call for killing and genocide. In genocidal rhetoric the 
victims are characterized as a threat to the survival and well-being of the in-group creating 
a public demand for a response to reduce the threat.244 As Ervin Staub theorizes, the 
immediate cause of genocide is that perpetrators come to believe either that the victims have 
something they want or (more likely) stand in the way of something they want.245 In the 
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discourse of ISIS, the victims are presented as a threat to the religious purity or even the 
existence of the Ummah and stand in its way of fulfilling its religious duty of establishing a 
pure Islamic Caliphate which will rule the entire world. Using a classic persuasion 
technique, the ISIS hate narrative is furthermore never changing and repeated ad nauseam 
through their various media platforms.246 It would be appropriate to consider Dabiq and 
Rumiyah as well as other ISIS outlets as media for incitement to genocide247 and try and 
identify, apprehend and bring to justice individuals involved in the ISIS media apparatus. 
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